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INTRODUCTION 
The defendants ("Intermountain Power") insist that the 
Industrial Commission correctly dismissed Ms. Bacon's claim with 
prejudice, despite ample evidence of her physical limitations and 
ineffective counsel. A careful reading of the Utah cases and 
applicable statutory law indicates the injustice of this decision 
in light of the circumstances of Ms. Bacon's case. 
ARGUMENT 
I, DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE ACTION GIVEN 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF MS. BACON'S CASE 
A dismissal with prejudice of Ms. Bacon's claim creates a 
hardship on an injured worker that goes far beyond the intent of 
established Utah law. While Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure authorizes the court to take sanctions "as are 
just,"(see Addendum) the facts of Ms. Bacon's case fail to rise 
to the level of misconduct evident in the Utah cases cited by 
Intermountain Power. Furthermore, worker's compensation 
proceedings do not adhere to statutory rules of procedure, and 
must construe the law generously in favor of the employee. 
First, both Utah cases cited do not concern a plaintiff 
seeking redress for physical injuries suffered in the workplace. 
In Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989), the party seeking reversal of a default judgement 
1 
was defending an insurance fraud claim. This Court stated that 
"[i]mposing sanctions for a party's refusal to respond to a court 
order compelling discovery is a harsh sanction and therefore, 
requires a "showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault on the 
part of the non-complying party." Id. at 961. The defendant, 
after defrauding his insurance company, left a trciil of 
"aggravated misconduct in the form of willful and deliberate 
disobedience of discovery orders, fabricated testimony, and 
attempted witness tampering." Id. at 962. This Court rightfully 
upheld the sanctions against him. In contrast, Ms. Bacon did not 
file her claim in bad faith, nor willfully refuse to answer 
interrogatories. She was suffering from a stress-related 
industrial injury and accordingly relied on her original attorney 
to pursue her claim properly. The sanction is particularly 
harsh, since Worker's Compensation precludes her pursuing her 
employer for compensation for her work injuries. 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court found that a default 
judgement was "a stringent measure which should be employed with 
caution and restraint only where the failure has been wilful[sic] 
and the interests of justice so demand. Except in very 
aggravated cases, less serious sanctions undoubtedly could be 
applied to accomplish the desired result." Tucker Realty, Inc. 
v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410, 412 (Utah 1964). The non-complying 
defendant in Nunley failed to produce documents supporting his 
claim of a debt discharge, and gave the court inconsistent 
information concerning the alleged documents; the court found 
2 
this behavior to be willful disregard of the proceedings. Id. at 
413. Again, Ms. Bacon's failure to provide, via her original 
attorney, a complete application and response to interrogatories 
should be viewed in light of her disabilities. Her conduct was 
neither willful nor deliberate; her injuries precluded active 
participation in her claim, and she relied, to her detriment, on 
her attorney. 
Furthermore, Rule 37(d) is not even applicable to Industrial 
Commission hearings, and thus Intermountain Power put misplaced 
reliance on an Arkansas decision based on statutes substantially 
different than the pertinent Utah statutes. Loosey v. Osmose Wood 
Preserving Co., 744 S.W.2d 402 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988). According 
to Arkansas law at the time the case was decided, the Worker's 
Compensation Commission's Rule 16 regulated discovery for claims 
before it: "Depositions may be taken and discovery had by any 
party after the claim has been controverted in accordance with 
the statutory provisions and rule of civil procedure relating to 
civil actions in the Chancery and Circuit Courts of this State. . 
." 744 S.W.2d at 403 (emphasis added). In sum, discovery 
followed the Arkansas rules of civil procedure, including Rule 
37(d) sanctions. 
In contrast, while Utah Rule 37(d) has the same sanction 
provisions as its Arkansas counterpart, the Utah statute on 
Industrial Commission administrative hearings mandates informal 
proceedings without adherence to established rules of procedure: 
"Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound 
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by the usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any 
technical or formal rules of procedure, other than as herein 
provided or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this act.11 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1988)(emphasis added) (see Addendum). 
Thus, the Industrial Commission is not bound by the Utah Rules of 
Procedure, particularly Rule 37(d) sanctions. Granted, Utah 
Industrial Commission Rule R490-l-4(h) (see Addendum) states that 
failure to comply with such requests may result in the dismissal 
of a claim," but offers an alternative sanction of "delay in the 
scheduling of a hearing." 
In addition, the Industrial Commission's decision to 
dismiss with prejudice violated the spirit and intent of the 
Worker's Compensation Act to protect employees; the Act must be 
construed liberally in favor of the employee. Jones v. 
California Packing Corp.. 244 P.2d 640 (Utah 1952); Salt Lake 
City v. Industrial Commission, 140 P.2d 644 (Utah- 1943); Park 
Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 64 P.2d 3 63 
(Utah 1934). 
Therefore, given the care and caution exercised by the Utah 
courts in using a Rule 37 dismissal with prejudice, and the 
informal, employee-oriented approach of worker's compensation 
proceedings, the Industrial Commission erred in dismissing Ms. 
Bacon's case with prejudice given the circumstances of her 
disabilities. 
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II. MS. BACON USED DUE DILIGENCE TO THE BEST OF HER ABILITY IN 
RESPONDING TO THE INTERROGATORIES. 
Intermountain Power wrongfully accused Ms. Bacon of failing 
to cooperate not only with the Commission, but her original 
attorney Mr. Lish. Ms. Bacon did not receive the interrogatory 
forms from Mr. Lish until January 14, 1992 (See Appellant's Brief 
p. 5), and mailed the completed forms back to him on January 24, 
1992 (see letter in Appellees' Brief, Addendum F). Furthermore, 
Ms. Bacon did not, contrary to Intermountain Power's rather 
fanciful interpretation, deliberately refuse to cooperate with 
Mr. Lish in giving him a full accounting of the facts 
precipitating her injury. A straightforward reading of his 
Motion for Review indicates that he made an unsuccessful attempt 
to get a statement of facts from Wausau's claims adjuster rather 
than cause additional stress upon Ms. Bacon. Mr. Lish made a 
tactical decision, based on Ms. Bacon's disabled state, to go 
elsewhere for information for the interrogatories rather than 
submit the forms to Ms. Bacon. At no time was she intentionally 
uncooperative, as Intermountain Power insinuates. 
Consequently, Ms. Bacon failure to file the interrogatories 
was not due to her careless or deliberate disregard of the 
requests. 
5 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the Administrative Law Judge's 
dismissal with prejudice, and remand for hearing on Ms. Bacon's 
amended application. 
Mil 
DATED this [Q day of November 1992. 
ANDERSON AND DREDGE 
By: uli^ U - l&uuL 
Sandra N. Dredge 
Attorney for the Appellant 
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A D D E N D U M 
Rule 37(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule R490-l-4(h), Industrial Commission of Utah 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 
Rule 37 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
their authenticity, to accept a copy of defen-
dant's written admissions served upon plaintiff 
as compliance with the rules; where the trial 
court chose the latter option, it was proper to 
permit plaintiff to recite defendant's admis-
sions into the record. Triple I Supply, Inc. v. 
Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982). 
—Failure to respond. 
Objectionable matter. 
Even if a request for an admission is objec-
tionable, if a party fails to object and fails to 
respond to the request, then that party should 
be held to have admitted the matter. Jensen v. 
Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 
1985). 
Prison inmate. 
When inmate served requests for admissions 
and interrogatories on prison officials in action 
for recovery of value of personal property taken 
from him, on failure of officials to respond to 
the requests, apply for extension of time, or 
move to amend or withdraw their admissions 
pursuant to Subdivision (b), all the facts were 
deemed admitted and the inmate was entitled 
to judgment against the officials. Schmitt v. 
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
—Motion to dismiss. 
Tolling. 
Filing a motion to dismiss did not toll effect 
of Subdivision (a), which treats requests for ad-
missions which are not answered within 45 
days as if admitted and as a proper basis for 
summary judgment. Schmitt v. Billings, 600 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
—Punitive damages. 
Where plaintiff requests an admission of pu-
nitive damages in an amount unrelated to ac-
tual damages, the court, as a matter of equity, 
must intervene and examine the admission. 
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 
(Utah 1985). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 151, 
379 P.2d 379 (1963); W.W. & W.B. Gardner, 
Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325. 
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110. 
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure tes-
timony of absent witness in civil case, admis-
sions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and 
rules, to respond to request for admission of 
facts not within his personal knowledge, 20 
A.L.R.3d 756. 
Formal sufficiency of response to request for 
admissions under state discovery rules, 8 
A.L.R.4th 728. 
Permissible scope, respecting nature of in-
quiry, of demand for admissions under modern 
state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489. 
Key Numbers. — Discovery <s= 121 to 129. 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) A p p r o p r i a t e court . An application for an order to a partv mav be 
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters' relating 
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall 
^ ™ *? t h e T c r o u r t i n t h e d i s t r i c t where the deposition is being taken 
U) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to 
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
ZZ!tVVf°gat0ry S ? b m i t t e u d u n d e f R u l e 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
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with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the 
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination be-
fore he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part it may make such 
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion 
made pursuant to Rule 26(c). 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision 
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose 
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reason-
able expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, 
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
among the parties and persons in a just manner, 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to 
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, 
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Sub-
division (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to oe established for the 
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
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(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders 
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless 
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such 
person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court 
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, 
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness 
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if 
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in 
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant 
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might 
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve a n s w e r s to 
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before 
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper 
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper 
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may 
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision 
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party 
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(0, the court may, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
to Rule 37, F.R.C.P. § 78-32-1 et seq. 
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R490-1-4 INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 84 
granted. Otherwise, compensation may not be al-
lowed 
P. "Attending Physician's Statement — Form 043" 
— This form must be completed by employee and his 
last attending physician in the state to establish the 
medical condition of the employee. It must be accom-
panied by Form 044. 
Q. "Compensation Agreement — Form 019" — 
This form is used by the parties to a workers' compen-
sation claim to enter into an agreement as to a per-
manent partial impairment award, and must be sub-
mitted to the Commission for approval 
R. "Application for Lump Sum or Advance Pay-
ment — Form 134" — This form is used by an em-
ployee to apply for a lump sum or advance payment 
for a permanent partial impairment award. 
S. "Release to Return to Work — Form 110" — 
This form may be used to meet the requirements of 
Rule R490-2-3E, as contained herein. 
T. "Insurance Carrier or Self-Insured Employer 
Annual Statement of Losses — Form 117" — Parts (a) 
and (b) are to be submitted together by January 31st 
for the preceding calendar year. Par t (a), an individ-
ual loss claim log, states the losses by individual 
claim and part (b) states the aggregate losses by the 
insurance carrier or self-insured employer for the pre-
ceding calendar year. 
Carriers or self-insured employers wishing to sub-
mit a computer tape in lieu of the form must obtain 
prior written authorization from the Industrial Com-
mission, Industnal Accidents Division. 
U. "Disability Status Report — Form 206" — This 
report is required, as per Section 35-10-6, U.C A , 
when an injured worker's temporary total compensa-
tion exceeds 90 days, or when it appears that the 
injured worker will be disabled, whichever comes 
first. The insurance carrier or the self-insured em-
ployer shall file this report with the Commission 
within 30 days thereafter. 
V. "Request for Copies From Claimant's File — 
Form 205" — This form is used to request copies from 
a claimant's file in the Industrial Commission with 
the appropriate authorized release. 
W "Medical Records — Copies — Form 302" — 
This form is used by a claimant to request a free copy 
of his/her medical records from a medical provider. 
This form must be signed by a staff member of the 
Industnal Accidents Division. 
X The Director of the Industrial Accidents Divi-
sion of the Commission may approve change of any of 
the above forms upon notice to all concerned parties. 
Carriers may print these forms or approved versions. 
R490-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery. 
A. For the purposes of Section 63-46b-3, U.C.A., all 
adjudicative proceedings for workers' compensation 
and occupational disease claims shall only be com-
menced by the injured worker or dependent filing a 
request for agency action with the Commission The 
Administrative Law Judge is afforded discretion m 
allowing intervention of other parties pursuant to 
Section 63-46b-9, U.C.A. The Application for Hearing 
is the request for agency action All such applications 
shall include supporting medical documentation of 
the claim where there is a dispute over medical is-
sues Applications without supporting documentation 
will not be mailed to the employer or insurance ear-
n e r for answer until the appropnate documents have 
been provided. 
B Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is 
denied by an employer or insurance earner, the bur-
den rests on the applicant to initiate the action by 
filing an Application for Hearing with the Commis-
sion. 
C When an Application for Hearing is filed with 
the Commission, the Commission shall forthwith 
mail a copy to the employer or to the employer's in-
surance carrier 
D. The employer or insurance car-ier shall have 30 
days following the date of the mailing of Ihe applica-
tion to file a written answer with the Industrial Com-
mission, admitting or denying liabi lty for the claim 
The answer should state ail affirmal ive defenses with 
sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may 
be fully informed of the. nature o" the defense as-
serted. All answers shall include a summary and cat-
egorization of benefits paid to dat€ on the claim. A 
copy shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is one, 
to the applicant's attorney by the defendant. 
E When an employer or insurance earner fails to 
file an answer within the 30 days provided above, the 
Commission may enter a default igamst such em-
ployer or insurance earner The Commission may 
then set the matter for heanng, tatce evidence bear-
ing on the claim, and enter an Order based on the 
evidence presented Such defaults may be set aside by 
following the procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure Said default shall apply to the defen-
dant employer or insurance earner and shall not be 
construed to deprive the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund or the Uninsured Employers Fund of any ap-
propriate defenses. 
F Where the answer denies liability solely on the 
medical aspects of the case, the applicant, through 
his/her attorney or agent, and the employer or insur-
ance earner, with the approval of t le Commission or 
its representative, may enter into a stipulated set of 
facts, which stipulation, together with the medical 
documents bearing on the case in the Commission's 
file, may be used in making the final determination 
of liability 
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or 
its representatives may have a prehear ing or post-
hearing conference. 
H Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may 
commence discovery with appropr ate sets of inter-
rogatories Such discovery should focus on the acci-
dent event, witnesses, as well as past and present 
medical care. The defendant shall ilso be entitled to 
appropriately signed medical releases to allow gath-
ering of pertinent medical records The defendant 
may also require the applicant to submit to an inde-
pendent medical examination to he conducted by a 
physician of the defendant's choice Failure of an ap-
plicant to comply with such requests may result in 
the dismissal of a claim or a delay in the scheduling 
of a hearing. 
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all 
discovery proceedings and must be signed, unless 
good cause is shown for a shorter period, at least one 
week prior to any scheduled hearing 
J All medical records shall be filed by the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit 
at least one week before the scheduled hearing 
Claimant must cooperate and sutmi t all pertinent 
medical records contained in his fi e to the employer 
or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit submis-
sion two weeks in advance of a s:heduled heanng 
Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed binder 
arranged by care provider in chronological order Ex-
hibits should include all relevant treatment records 
with the exception of hospital nurses notes 
K The Administrative Law Judg e must be notified 
one week in advance of any proceeding where it is 
•1-88 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Workmen's Compensation Act. Ellis v. In- fees in same manner and with same limita 
itrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363 tions as it may review any other decision of the 
37). commission. Ellis v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 
attorneys' fees in compensation cases should Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363 (1937); Thatcher v. In-
measured according to the workingman's dustrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d 
tion. Ellis v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah (1949). 
>, 64 P.2d 363 (1937). „ 
Suspension of attorney from practice. 
view by Supreme Court. Attorney's indirect collection of fees from cli-
ndustrial Commission not only has power to ents in excess of those awarded by Industrial 
attorneys' fees in cases before it, but it also Commission constituted unprofessional con-
> power to fix fees for services rendered on duct resulting in one year's suspension from 
iew in Supreme Court, Supreme Court only practice. In re Hatch, 108 Utah 446, 160 P.2d 
zing power to review matter of attorney's 961 (1945). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Jtah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in or trying workmen's compensation claims or 
ah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. cases as practice of law, 2 A.L.R.2d 724. 
U . S . — 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
n § 817. <& 1981. 
\ .L.R. — Handling, preparing, presenting, 
5-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before commis-
sion and hearing examiner — Admissible evi-
dence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound by the 
;ual common-law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or for-
al rules of procedure, other than as herein provided or as adopted by the 
mmission pursuant to this act. The commission may make its investigation 
such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substan-
al rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workmen's 
Dmpensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in 
spute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited 
the following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts 
or other records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 88; C.L. 1917, Meaning of "this act". — See same catch-
3148; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-82; L. 1965, line in notes following § 35-1-46. 
I . 67, § 1. Cross-References . — Rules for procedure of 
commission, § 35-1-10. 
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